Market makers provide liquidity to other market participants: they propose prices at which they stand ready to buy and sell a wide variety of assets. They face a complex optimization problem with both static and dynamic components. They need indeed to propose bid and offer/ask prices in an optimal way for making money out of the difference between these two prices (their bid-ask spread). Since they seldom buy and sell simultaneously, and therefore hold long and/or short inventories, they also need to mitigate the risk associated with price changes, and subsequently skew their quotes dynamically. In this paper, (i) we propose a general modeling framework which generalizes (and reconciles) the various modeling approaches proposed in the literature since the publication of the seminal paper "High-frequency trading in a limit order book" by Avellaneda and Stoikov, (ii) we prove new general results on the existence and the characterization of optimal market making strategies, (iii) we obtain new closed-form approximations for the optimal quotes, (iv) we extend the modeling framework to the case of multi-asset market making and we obtain general closed-form approximations for the optimal quotes of a multi-asset market maker, and (v) we show how the model can be used in practice in the specific (and original) case of two credit indices.
Introduction
What is a market maker? In a nutshell, it is a liquidity provider. However, it is complex to give a precise definition because the exact role of market makers depends on the considered market. Furthermore, the very definition of a market maker has been blurred in recent years, because of the electronification of most markets and because of the emergence of high-frequency trading in many of them.
On most order-driven markets, such as many stock markets, there are nowadays several kinds of market makers. First, there are "official" market makers (actually, market making companies): these market makers have usually signed an agreement with a given exchange, or with a given company, for maintaining fair and orderly markets. The Designated Market Makers (DMM) on the NYSE, which succeeded the market specialists, are examples of such "official" market makers. They often have contractual obligations, such as participating to the opening and closing auctions and/or quoting with a reasonable bid-ask spread -e.g. the DMMs must quote at the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) a specified percentage of the time. In addition to these "official" market makers, other market participants in the stock markets, in particular some high-frequency traders, are often regarded as market makers (Menkveld calls them the new market makers in [20] ) because they are almost continuously present on both sides of the limit order books. They are acting as liquidity providers even though they have no obligation to do so: they just try to make money out of their high-frequency market making strategies. The electronification of most order-driven markets makes it possible for trading firms to act as liquidity providers, hence a blurring of the definition of "market maker".
On quote-driven markets, such as the corporate bond markets, the market makers are the dealers (these markets are often also called "dealer markets"). These dealers provide liquidity to the other market participants (the "clients") by quoting bid and offer prices on a regular basis. However, their exact behavior depends on the considered market. On some markets, dealers' quotes are firm quotes, whereas on other markets the quotes are streamed only for information (and for a specific size/notional) and become binding when dealers answer specific requests.
In this paper, we consider that a market maker is somebody (or in fact an algorithm) who proposes prices at which he/she/it stands ready to buy or sell one or several assets. In particular, we do not consider any contractual constraint, and we assume that all quotes are firm quotes (for a given fixed size). The problem we consider is the determination of the optimal quotes a market maker should propose at the bid and the offer to make money while mitigating inventory risk.
This problem is a complex one from a quantitative viewpoint with both static and dynamic components. Market makers face indeed a classical static trade-off: high margin and low volume vs. low margin and high volume. A market maker who quotes a large spread (with no skew) trades rarely, but each transaction leads to a large Mark-to-Market (MtM) gain. Conversely, a market maker quoting a narrow spread (with no skew) trades often, but each transaction leads to a small MtM gain. In addition to this static trade-off, market makers face a dynamic problem: they must adapt their quotes dynamically to reduce their exposure to price changes. For instance, a single-asset market maker with a long inventory should price conservatively on the bid side and aggressively on the ask side, because he wants to reduce his probability to buy and increase his probability to sell. Symmetrically, if he has a short inventory, then he should price aggressively on the bid side and conservatively on the ask side.
Like in almost all the mathematical literature on market making, we consider the problem of a single market maker in a simplified way: (i) market prices 1 are modeled by stochastic processes assumed to be exogenous to the market maker's behavior, 2 and (ii) the probability that the market maker buys (respectively sells) a security at the bid (respectively offer) price he quotes 1 The exact nature of these market prices depends on the considered market. In the case of most order-driven markets (such as most stock markets), a market price may be a mid-price. It may also be a price based on the most recent transactions. In the case of the European corporate bond market, the Composite Bloomberg Bond Trader (CBBT) price is a composite price which may be regarded as a proxy for the market price of a bond. In the case of the US corporate bond market, a market price may also be built by using a mix between TRACE data (in spite of the lag) and the CBBT prices. In all cases, the market prices involved in the model should be regarded as reference prices.
2 See [7] and [13] for models with adverse selection effects.
depends on the distance between the quoted price and the market price of that security -thispaper, we have instead in mind the case of a market maker in a quote-driven market, or in an order-driven market if the tick sizes of the securities are small.
The academic literature on market making is also mainly focused on the case of a market maker operating on a single asset. However, in practice, almost all market makers are in charge of a list of securities. For a market maker in charge of several correlated assets, applying an independent market making strategy to each asset is suboptimal in terms of risk management. It is therefore of the utmost importance to build a model accounting for the correlation structure of the security price moves, especially in the case of corporate bonds where there are often dozens of bonds issued by the same company (which are therefore highly correlated).
In this paper, we consider a modeling framework à la Avellaneda-Stoikov with general intensity functions, instead of the exponential intensity functions of most models (see Section 2) . We show that the four-variable HJB equation arising from the various optimization criteria used in the literature can be transformed into a simple system of ordinary differential equations (see Section 3 ). This somehow reconciles the different approaches used in the literature and enables to understand the subtle differences between the various criteria used in the literature. In particular it helps understanding what it means to be averse to price risk and to non-execution risk. We then show in Section 4 how to find closed-form approximations for the optimal quotes. These approximations generalize the Guéant-Lehalle-Fernandez-Tapia formulas to the case of general intensity functions and to the case of the different optimization criteria used in the market making literature. In Section 5, we consider a problem that is very rarely dealt with in the academic literature in spite of its importance for practitioners: multi-asset market making. We show that many results obtained in the one-asset case can be generalized to our multi-asset market making model. In particular, we obtain for the first time in this paper closed-form approximations for the optimal quotes of a multi-asset market maker. This result is an important breakthrough for practitioners because most market makers are in charge of dozens of assets (or even hundreds of assets when the market maker is in fact an algorithm) and often reluctant to solve very large systems of nonlinear differential equations. In Section 6, we apply our findings to the case of two highly correlated credit indices: CDX.NA.IG (CDX North America Investment Grade) and CDX.NA.HY (CDX North America High Yield).
Modeling framework and notations

Notations
Let us fix a probability space (Ω, F, P) equipped with a filtration (F t ) t∈R+ satisfying the usual conditions. We assume that all stochastic processes are defined on (Ω, F, (F t ) t∈R+ , P).
We consider in this section (and in the following two sections) a market maker in charge of a single asset. The reference price of this asset 9 is modeled by a process (S t ) t with the dynamics
where (W t ) t is a standard Brownian motion adapted to the filtration (F t ) t∈R+ .
This market maker proposes bid and ask quotes to buy and sell the asset. These bid and ask quotes are modeled by two stochastic processes, respectively denoted by (S b t ) t and (S a t ) t .
9 There may not be a proper market price (see the above discussion), hence the wording "reference price".
Transactions occur at random times corresponding to the arrival times of agents willing to buy or sell the asset. The distribution of the trade times depends obviously on the liquidity of the asset, and on the bid and ask prices quoted by the market maker. We denote by (N b t ) t and (N a t ) t the two point processes modeling the number of transactions at the bid and at the ask, respectively. We assume that assets are traded ∆ by ∆, i.e., that the quantities traded do not vary across trades.
The inventory of the market maker, modeled by the process (q t ) t , has therefore the dynamics
We assume that the processes (N b t ) t and (N a t ) t are independent of the Brownian motion (W t ) t . We denote by (λ b t ) t and (λ a t ) t the intensity processes of (N b t ) t and (N a t ) t , respectively. As in the classical Avellaneda-Stoikov model (see [1] ), we assume that the intensity processes are functions of the difference between the reference price and the prices quoted by the market maker. In addition, we assume that the market maker stops proposing a bid (respectively ask) quote when his position is above (respectively below) a given threshold Q (respectively −Q). 10 Formally, we assume that (λ b t ) t and (λ a t ) t verify 
11
• Λ b and Λ a are twice continuously differentiable,
• Λ b and Λ a are decreasing, with ∀δ ∈ R, Λ b (δ) < 0 and Λ a (δ) < 0,
Finally, the process (X t ) t models the market maker's cash account. Given our modeling framework, (X t ) t has the dynamics
10 Q is assumed to be a multiple of ∆. 11 The first three hypotheses are natural. The fourth one is more technical. It ensures in particular that the functions π b : δ → δΛ b (δ) and π a : δ → δΛ a (δ), which are related to the instantaneous (expected) MtM PnL associated with each side, reach a maximum on R (in fact on R + ). To see this (we focus on the bid side, but the proof is similar for the ask side), let us notice that
is a strictly increasing function with
Therefore, the equation υ b (δ) = 0 has a unique solution and it corresponds to a unique maximizer for π b .
The two classical optimization problems
In the above paragraphs, we have defined the three processes at the heart of most market making models: the reference price process (S t ) t , the inventory process (q t ) t , and the cash process (X t ) t . We now need to define the problem faced by the market maker. Following the model proposed by Avellaneda and Stoikov in [1] , one can consider, as in [13] , that the market maker maximizes the expected value of a CARA utility function (with risk aversion parameter γ > 0) applied to the MtM value of the portfolio at a given date T . This MtM value at time T is basically X T + q T S T , or X T + q T S T − (|q T |) if we add a liquidity premium for the remaining inventory (whatever its sign) -is a nondecreasing and convex function from R + to R + . In this general framework, the goal of the market maker is to maximize
where the set of admissible controls A is simply the set of predictable processes bounded from below.
Alternatively, one can consider that the market maker maximizes the expected value of the MtM value of the portfolio at date T , but that holding an inventory is penalized over the time interval [0, T ]. This is typically what is done by Cartea, Jaimungal and their coauthors (see the recent book [7] for several examples). In that kind of model, the goal of the market maker is to maximize an expression of the form
3 Towards a single system of ordinary differential equations for characterizing the optimal quotes
Both Model A and Model B can be solved using the classical tools of stochastic optimal control. In particular, we show that, in both models, finding the value function (and the optimal bid and ask quotes) boils down to solving a tridiagonal system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs), and that the equations associated with Model A and Model B are part of the same family of ODEs.
Dimensionality of the problem: a reduction from 4 to 2
The HJB equation associated with Model A is given by
for q ∈ Q = {−Q, −Q+∆, . . . , Q−∆, Q}, and (t, S, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R 2 , with the terminal condition
If one uses the ansatz
then Eq. (3.1) becomes
for q ∈ Q, and t ∈ [0, T ], and the terminal condition (3.2) becomes θ(T, q) = − (|q|).
The HJB equation associated with Model B is given by
for q ∈ Q, and (t, S, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R 2 , with the terminal condition
If one uses the ansatz u(t, x, q, S) = x + qS + θ(t, q), (3.7)
then Eq. (3.5) becomes
for q ∈ Q, and t ∈ [0, T ], and the terminal condition (3.6) becomes θ(T, q) = − (|q|).
Eqs. (3.4) and (3.8) are in fact two systems of ODEs which belong to the same family. If we introduce for ξ > 0 the functions
and
and the limit functions (for ξ = 0)
then we can indeed consider the general equation
for q ∈ Q, and t ∈ [0, T ], with the terminal condition θ(T, q) = − (|q|). 
Existence and uniqueness of a solution θ
In the following paragraphs, we prove, for all ξ ≥ 0, that there exists a unique solution θ to Eq. (3.9) with terminal condition (3.10).
Let us start with a lemma on H The supremum in the definition of
Similarly, the supremum in the definition of
Furthermore, the functions p →δ b * ξ (p) and p →δ a * ξ (p) are C 1 and increasing.
Proof.
We prove the results for the bid side. The proof is similar for the ask side.
Let us start with ξ > 0.
g p is a function of class C 1 , positive for δ ∈ (p, +∞) and nonpositive otherwise. Because g p (p) = 0 and lim δ→+∞ g p (δ) = 0, the supremum of g p is attained at, at least, one point δ b * ξ (p) ∈ (p, +∞). The first order condition characterizing the suprema of g p is
By rearranging the terms, we obtain
, the function
is increasing 12 and there is therefore a unique maximizerδ
Moreover, by the implicit function theorem, p →δ
Moreover, the function H b ξ is of class C 2 , with
In particular, H b ξ is decreasing. 12 We have indeed
We also see, by using the definition of
In the ξ = 0 case, we define ∀p ∈ R, h p :
h p is a function of class C 1 , positive for δ ∈ (p, +∞) and nonpositive otherwise. By using the same reasoning as in footnote 11, we see that there is a unique maximizerδ
As above, by the implicit function theorem, p → δ
In particular, p →δ
Moreover, the function H b 0 is of class C 2 , with
0 is decreasing and we havẽ
This proves the lemma.
We now prove a comparison principle for Eq. (3.9) which gives a priori bounds that will enable us to prove the existence of a solution to Eq. (3.9) with terminal condition (3.10).
Let θ : [τ, T ] × Q → R be a C 1 function with respect to time satisfying the subsolution property, i.e., ∀q ∈ Q, θ(T, q) ≤ − (|q|)
Let θ : [τ, T ]×Q → R be a C 1 function with respect to time satisfying the supersolution property, i.e., ∀q ∈ Q, θ(T, q) ≥ − (|q|)
Let ε > 0.
Let us consider a couple
by using the definition of the functions θ and θ, the above inequality gives
But, by definition of (t * ε , q * ε ), since H b ξ and H a ξ are decreasing functions, we have
This leads to 0 ≤ −ε. By contradiction, we must have t * ε = T .
Therefore, sup
By sending ε to 0, we obtain θ ≤ θ.
Let us now come to the existence and uniqueness of a solution to Eq. (3.9) with terminal condition (3.10). It is straightforward to verify that ∀q ∈ Q,
is a decreasing function. Therefore, the only reason why there would not be a global solution on [0, T ] is because sup q∈Q θ(t, q) blows up at τ > 0. However, by using Lemma 3.2, we know that
defines a supersolution of Eq. (3.9) with terminal condition (3.10), and therefore that sup q∈Q θ(t, q)
The conclusion is that θ is in fact defined on [0, T ] × Q. Uniqueness comes then for the CauchyLipschitz theorem.
The existence (and uniqueness) of a function θ solution of Eq. (3.9) with terminal condition (3.10) enables us to find a solution to the HJB equation associated with Model A or Model B. We will use a verification argument in the next subsection in order to prove that the solution to the HJB equation we obtain by this way is indeed the value function of the stochastic optimal control problem under consideration. However, before that, a remark needs to be made on θ and on Eq. (3.9) in the specific case -often (not to say almost always) used in the academic literature -of exponential intensities.
If we have
, then we obtain (by straightforward computations)
where
By using Eq. (3.9), the function
is solution of the linear system of ordinary differential equations
Verification argument
We are now ready to solve the stochastic optimal control problems associated with Model A and Model B. We start with Model A. Then, u : (t, x, q, S) → − exp(−γ(x + qS + θ(t, q))) defines a solution to Eq. (3.1) with terminal condition (3.2), and
where A(t) is the set of predictable processes on [t, T ], bounded from below and where The optimal bid and ask quotes S 
We also have
By taking expectations in Eq. (3.15), we obtain
By definition of u, we have therefore
By definition of θ, we have the inequality
i.e., Therefore, u is indeed the value function u(t, x, q, S) = sup
and the optimal quotes are given in closed-loop by Eq. (3.14).
For Model B, a similar result holds. Then, u : (t, x, q, S) → x + qS + θ(t, q) defines a solution to Eq. (3.5) with terminal condition (3.6), and
Proof.
Let us consider t ∈ [0, T ), and two processes (δ b s ) s≥t and (δ a s ) s≥t in A(t). We have
By taking expectations in Eq. (3.17), we obtain
By definition of θ, we have the inequality Therefore, u is indeed the value function
and the optimal quotes are given in closed-loop by Eq. (3.16).
Comments on the results
In both Model A and Model B, the dynamic optimization problem faced by the market maker was initially characterized by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation with 4 variables: the time t, and 3 state variables (the cash x, the inventory q, and the reference price S). The objective functions of Model A and Model B lead to similar equations, but it is interesting to understand the differences between the two modeling approaches. In fact, the penalization term 1 2 γσ
in Model B leads to the term 1 2 γσ 2 q 2 in the ODEs characterizing θ (when ξ = 0), and this term arises also in the ODE associated with Model A (when ξ = γ) because of the market maker's aversion to price risk. However, in Model A, the market maker is not only averse to price risk, but also to the risk of not finding a counterparty to trade with -this is what we call non-execution risk. There is indeed a source of risk coming from the process (W t ) t , and another source of risk coming from the processes (N b t ) t and (N a t ) t , and risk aversion in Model A applies to both kinds of risk. In other words, things work as if the market maker of Model A was risk averse to both kinds of risk, while the market maker of Model B is only averse to the risk associated with price changes. In particular, the parameter ξ can be regarded as some form of risk aversion parameter applying to non-execution risk only: it is equal to γ in the case of Model A, and equal to 0 in the case of Model B.
Closed-form and almost-closed-form approximations
In [13] , the authors show in the specific case where Λ b (δ) = Λ a (δ) = Ae −kδ =: Λ(δ) that there is an asymptotic regime far from T for the optimal quotes in Model A. 13 In other words, far from the terminal time T , the optimal quotes in [13] are well approximated by functions that only depend on the inventory q -and not on the time variable t. In practice, in markets (such as most dealer-driven OTC markets) for which there is no natural terminal time T , this result is not surprising -even, somehow, reassuring -and only the asymptotic formula should be used. Furthermore, the authors of [13] proposed closed-form approximations for the asymptotic values of the optimal quotes. In this section, we propose new approximation formulas which generalize those obtained in [13] to a more general set of intensity functions, and to both Model A and Model B (only Model A was considered in [13] ). These more general approximations are based on heuristic arguments, and we will see in the numerical experiments of Section 6 when they are (or are not) satisfactory.
Approximation with an elliptic partial differential equation
To compute the optimal quotes given in Eqs. (3.14) and (3.16), the first step consists in computing the function θ solution of the system of ODEs (3.9), with terminal condition (3.10). In order to approximate the optimal quotes, we first approximate therefore the function θ.
To carry out our reasoning, we suppose that the intensity functions Λ b and Λ a are identical (equal to Λ), and that
14 Our heuristic reasoning consists in replacing the function θ : [0, T ] × Q → R by a functioñ θ : [0, T ] × R → R and to replace the system of ODEs (3.9) characterizing θ, i.e.,
This PDE comes from an expansion in of the expression
∆ , applied to = 1.
16
We have indeed
By consideringṽ 14 The condition H ξ (0) > 0 is always verified when ξ = 0 (see the proof of Lemma 3.1). A sufficient condition in general is
This condition (obtained by using the expression of H ξ in the proof of Lemma 3.1) is verified for instance if Λ is convex (exponential intensities enter this category). 15 We remove here the boundaries associated with −Q and Q. 16 Another way to see this expansion is to consider an expansion of order 2 in ∆ (an expansion of order 1 would correspond, after rescaling H ξ , to a fluid-limit regime where non-execution risk vanishes) combined with an approximation of H ξ by using the first three terms of its Taylor expansion (in 0).
the nonlinear PDE (4.1) becomes the linear PDE
and the terminal condition relevant with our problem is
Eq. (4.2) is a linear PDE and it can be studied using basic tools of spectral theory. Our goal is to study the asymptotic behavior ofṽ(t, q) when T tends to infinity, and to use the formulas obtained in this asymptotic regime in order to approximate successivelyṽ,θ, θ, and ultimately the optimal quotes (δ b * t ) t and (δ a * t ) t .
Generalization of the Guéant-Lehalle-Fernandez-Tapia's formulas
By classical spectral theory, 18 we know that
where ν andf 0 are respectively the minimum and a minimizer of the functional
and where (·, ·) designates the scalar product in L 2 (R).
In particular,f
where C is a constant, independent of (t, q), we deduce:
17 One can see the proximity with Eq. (3.13). 18 The basic reasoning consists in proving that the operatorṽ → − 1 2
qqṽ is a positive self-adjoint operator with a compact inverse (see Chapter 6 of [3] for more details). Therefore, this operator can be diagonalized in an orthonormal basis. Its minimum eigenvalue can be shown to be simple by using the same methodology as in [13] .
As a consequence, we consider the approximations
.
These approximations are independent of t and of the final penalty function . They can be plugged into Eqs. (3.14) and (3.16) to obtain the general approximation formulas
and we obtain In particular, we recover, in the specific case where ∆ = 1 and ξ = γ, the Guéant-LehalleFernandez-Tapia's formula of [13] and [15] often used in the industry.
Comments on the approximations
The approximations obtained above deserve a few comments. First, in the general case (i.e., even when the intensity function Λ is not exponential), the approximations are almost in closed form, in the sense that they are only functions of the parameters and of transforms of Λ. In practice, one simply needs to compute Λ −1 , H ξ , H ξ , and H ξ , in order to compute the approximations (4.3) and (4.4). Second, the above approximations enable to better understand the optimal strategy of a market maker, and the role played by the different parameters. In particular, they enable to better understand the different types of risk faced by a market maker.
By using Eqs. (4.3) and (4.4), we see that
This means that a market maker proposes lower prices at the bid and at the ask when his inventory increases, and conversely, higher prices at the bid and at the ask when his inventory decreases. In particular, a market maker with a positive or negative inventory always skews his bid and ask prices in order to increase his chance to go back to a flat position.
In the particular case of exponential intensities, it is interesting to notice that the approximation of the bid-ask spread is independent of q, and the skew is linear in q:
if ξ = 0.
As far as volatility is concerned, we have
Therefore we have three cases:
In other words, an increase in volatility leads to an increase in the bid-ask spread, symmetric around the reference price (no skew).
• if q ≥ ∆, then approx (q) < 0. In other words, an increase in volatility leads to lower bid and ask prices: it increases the skew in absolute value, ceteris paribus.
In other words, an increase in volatility leads to higher bid and ask prices: it increases the skew in absolute value, ceteris paribus.
In the particular case of exponential intensities, it is interesting to notice that the bid-ask spread is approximated by an affine function of σ, and the skew by a linear function of σ (see Eqs. (4.8) and (4.9)).
As far as liquidity is concerned, if we replace Λ by βΛ, for β > 0, then we see that H ξ is replaced by βH ξ , and thatδ ξ is unchanged (see Eq. (4.5)). Therefore, we see from Eqs. β . In other words, an increase in liquidity is equivalent to a decrease in volatility and, conversely, a decrease in liquidity has the same effects as an increase in volatility.
As far as risk aversion is concerned, the differences between Model A and Model B help to clarify the different roles played by γ.
In the case of Model B, where ξ = 0, we see from Eqs. (4.3) and (4.4) , that an increase in γ is equivalent to an increase in σ 2 . In particular, an increase in γ increases the bid-ask spread and increases the skew in absolute value. This is expected, since γ, in Model B, penalizes positive and negative inventory.
In the case of Model A, the situation is different, but the introduction of the variable ξ helps to understand what is at stake. As already mentioned, everything works as if ξ was a risk aversion parameter for non-execution risk and γ a risk aversion parameter for price risk. To analyze the different effects, we consider the specific case of exponential intensities. We see in Eq. (4.8) that the approximation of the bid-ask spread is made of two parts:
1.
2 ξ∆ log 1 + ξ∆ k , which is decreasing in ξ. This term is related to the static risk faced by a market maker, associated with transaction uncertainty only. When ξ = γ increases, a market maker reduces his bid-ask spread to lower the uncertainty with respect to transactions.
∆
, which is increasing in γ and ξ = γ. This term, that only appears with volatility, is related to the dynamic risk faced by a market maker. This risk is complex and definitely more subtle than the classical risk that the price moves. In fact, both ξ and γ appear in the formula because the risk faced by a market maker is actually the risk that the price moves adversely without him being able to unwind his position rapidly enough (because of trade uncertainty). The higher the risk aversion to this combination of price risk and non-execution risk, the larger the bid-ask spread, because a market maker wants to avoid holding large inventories (in absolute value).
As far as the skew is concerned, only the second effect matters. This is confirmed by Eq. (4.9), and we see that the skew in absolute value is increasing with γ and ξ = γ.
Comparative statics is always interesting to understand the role played by the different parameters involved in a model. Here, we have carried out comparative statics on almost-closed-form and closed-form approximations, and not on the original optimal bid and ask quotes, which can only be computed numerically. We will see in Section 6 the differences between the actual optimal bid and ask quotes and the approximations proposed in this section. 19 
Multi-asset market making strategies
In most papers of the academic literature on market making, only single-asset market making is tackled. In practice, however, market makers are often in charge of a book of several assets. An evident case is the one of corporate bonds, since there are usually dozens of bonds issued by the same company, and the same market maker is in charge of all these bonds. As a consequence, optimal quotes for a specific bond should not depend on the market maker's inventory in that bond, but instead on the risk profile of the whole bond portfolio with respect to the issuer. In particular, when a market maker has a short inventory in an asset and an almost equivalent long inventory in another asset, highly correlated with the first, there may be no reason for him to skew his bid and ask quotes on these two assets, contrary to what single-asset market making models would suggest. In this section, we generalize our market making model to the multi-asset case. In particular, we obtain closed-form approximations for the optimal quotes of a multi-asset market maker.
Modeling framework and notations
We consider a market maker in charge of d assets. For i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, the reference price of asset i is modeled by a process (S i t ) t with the following dynamics
Brownian motion adapted to the filtration (F t ) t∈R+ , with nonsingular correlation matrix. We denote by Σ = (ρ i,j σ i σ j ) 1≤i,j≤d , the variance-covariance matrix associated with the process (S t ) t = (S
This market maker proposes bid and ask quotes to buy and sell the d assets. These bid and ask quotes are modeled by 2d stochastic processes, respectively denoted by (S
As in the single-asset case, we denote by (N i,b t ) t and (N i,a t ) t , for each i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, the two point processes modeling the number of transactions at the bid and at the ask, respectively, for asset i. We assume that the asset i is traded ∆ i units by ∆ i units.
The inventory of the market maker, modeled by the d-dimensional process (q t ) t = (q 1 t , . . . , q d t ) t , has therefore the following dynamics:
We assume that the processes (N
, where d is a penalty function.
In the d-dimensional generalization of Model B, the problem consists instead in maximizing
Towards a general system of ordinary differential equations
For solving the two stochastic optimal control problems of Model A and Model B, we use similar changes of variables as in Section 3. In particular, we show that finding the value function (and the optimal bid and ask quotes) in both models boils down to solving a system of ordinary differential equations, and that, as in the single-asset case, the equations associated with Model A and Model B are part of the same family of ODEs.
then Eq. (5.5) becomes
for ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, q i ∈ Q i , and t ∈ [0, T ], and the terminal condition (5.6) becomes θ(T, q) =
then Eq. (5.9) becomes
for ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, q i ∈ Q i , and t ∈ [0, T ], and the terminal condition (5.10) becomes θ(T, q) =
As in the single-asset case, Eqs. (5.8) and (5.12) are in fact two systems of ODEs which belong to the same family. Let us introduce for ξ > 0 the functions
Then, we can consider the general equation
for ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, q i ∈ Q i , and t ∈ [0, T ], with the terminal condition
Eq. (5.8) corresponds to Eq. (5.13) for ξ = γ while Eq. (5.12) corresponds to Eq. (5.13) for ξ = 0.
Solution of the market making problem
In order to characterize the optimal quotes in our multi-asset market making model, we proceed as in the single-asset case. In particular, we start by proving that there exists a solution of Eq. (5.13) with terminal condition (5.14).
Theorem 5.1. There exists a unique function θ : 
∀q ∈
is a decreasing function. Therefore, the only reason why there would not be a global solution on [0, T ] is because sup q∈ d i=1 Q i θ(t, q) blows up at τ > 0. However, by using a comparison principle similar to that of Lemma 3.2, we easily see that
Uniqueness comes then for the Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem.
We are now ready to state the two theorems characterizing the optimal quotes in Model A and Model B. The proofs of these results are based on verification arguments, and are (mutatis mutandis) identical to those in the single-asset case.
Let us start with Model A. 
where ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, dS
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, dq
and where ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, the point processes N i,b and N i,a have stochastic intensity (λ
For i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, the optimal bid and ask quotes S 
For model B, the result is the following:
Theorem 5.3. Let us consider the solution θ of Eq. (5.13) with terminal condition (5.14) for ξ = 0.
defines a solution to Eq. (5.9) with terminal condition (5.10), and u(t, x, q, S) = sup
where: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, dS
and where ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, the point processes 
About closed-form approximations
In the single-asset case, closed-form approximations were obtained in Section 4, in the special case where Λ b = Λ a =: Λ and H ξ (0) > 0. 21 In the multi-asset case, if we assume that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, Λ i,b = Λ i,a =: Λ i , and H i ξ (0) > 0, then it is natural to wonder whether the same techniques can be used in order to obtain closed-form approximations.
The answer is in fact that the change of variables used to derive closed-form approximations does not work in general in dimension higher than 1. However, the idea of transforming Eq. (5.13) into a multidimensional equivalent of Eq. (4.1) enables to obtain results, without using the Hopf-Cole transform -i.e., without relying on a multidimensional equivalent of Eq. (4.2).
Following the same reasoning as in Section 4, we can indeed introduce the PDE 17) with final conditionθ(T, q 1 , . . . ,
In the case where
with (a i,j ) i,j a symmetric positive matrix, it is easy to see that Eq. (5.17) can be solved in closed-form by using the ansatz
where θ 2 (t) is a d × d symmetric matrix (see the companion paper [9] ).
In particular, we show in [9] that θ 2 (t) verifies:
Very recently, closed-form approximations have also been found in the case of asymmetric intensities -see [9] .
As a consequence, we can consider the approximations
These approximations can be plugged into Eqs. (5.15) and (5.16) to obtain the general approximation formulas
These approximation formulas are interesting because we see the cross-effects coming from the non-diagonal terms of the matrix Γ.
6 Application: the case of two credit indices
In this section, we apply our single-asset and multi-asset market making models, along with the associated closed-form approximations, to the case of two credit (or CDS) indices: the investment grade (IG) index CDX.NA.IG and the high yield (HY) index CDX.NA.HY. We consider a market maker who is in charge of proposing bid and ask quotes for these two indices, and we will assume throughout this section that this market maker is only concerned with spread risk and not with default risk -this hypothesis is always made by practitioners for market making fixed-income and credit instruments.
Without going into the details of these indices, 22 we need to specify their main financial characteristics. Basically, for the IG index, the protection buyer pays quarterly (at fixed dates in order to ease compensation) a coupon corresponding to an annualized rate of 100 bps, and pays upfront an amount (positive or negative) corresponding to an upfront rate (positive or negative) determined by the market. In practice, for market making, the upfront rate is the relevant variable because a round trip on the index leads to a PnL corresponding to the difference between upfront rates (times the notional of the transaction). However, in practice, this index is quoted in spread -this spread being computed using a basic CDS model. For the HY index, the protection buyer pays quarterly (at fixed dates) a coupon corresponding to an annualized rate of 500 bps, and pays upfront an amount (positive or negative) corresponding to an upfront rate (positive or negative) determined by the market. Unlike the IG index, the HY index is quoted in upfront rate, or more precisely as 100(1 − upfront rate). It is also noteworthy that, in practice, buying the IG index means buying protection, whereas buying the HY index means selling protection. For simplifying the exposition, we will consider that buying always means buying protection, and that the index quotes are the upfront rates. The conversion of our numerical results into market standard quotes can easily be carried out by using a basic CDS model.
In order to apply our models to these credit indices, we need first to estimate the value of the different parameters. This has been done thanks to the data provided by BNP Paribas in the framework of the Research Initiative "Nouveaux traitements pour les données lacunaires issues des activités de crédit", which is financed by BNP Paribas under the aegis of the Europlace Institute of Finance. For estimating the volatilty and correlation parameters σ IG , σ HY , and ρ, mid-prices (prices here are upfront rates) have been considered. For the intensity functions, exponential intensities have been considered and the parameters A IG , k IG , A HY , and k HY have been estimated with classical likelihood maximization techniques using real quotes posted by the bank and the trades occurring between the bank and other market participants. Coming now to the order sizes, we consider orders of size ∆ IG = $50 million for the IG index, and orders of size ∆ HY = $10 million for the HY index.
As far as risk aversion is concerned, we consider a reference value γ = 6 · 10
Regarding risk limits, we consider that
Finally, we always consider a final time T = 7200 s, corresponding to 2 hours. We will see indeed on the examples below that the asymptotic regime is reached very rapidly, in far less than 2 hours.
We can consider first the case of the IG index alone. We approximated the solution θ of the systems of ODEs (3.9) by using an implicit scheme and a Newton's method at each time step to deal with the nonlinearity. Then we obtained the feedback control function
which gives the optimal bid and ask quotes 24 at time t when q
We see in Figure 1 that the asymptotic regime is reached after less than 1 hour.
In Figures 2 and 3 , we plot the initial (i.e., asymptotic) values of the bid and ask quotes, obtained with Model A, for the IG index, when it is considered on a stand-alone basis. We see that the market maker quotes conservatively at the bid and aggressively at the ask when he is long, and conversely that he quotes conservatively at the ask and aggressively at the bid when he is short. We also see that the closed-form approximations are satisfactory for small values of the inventory (in absolute value), but more questionable for larger values. In particular, the optimal quotes are not affine functions of the inventory as the closed-form approximations suggest.
The difference between actual values, obtained through the numerical approximation of the solution of a system of ODEs, and closed-form approximations can also be seen in Figures 4  and 5 , which represent the bid-ask spread and the skew of a market maker quoting optimally. The bid-ask spread is indeed not constant, and the skew is not linear on our example. However, if we consider market conditions with less volatility, then the closed-form approximations are far better -see Figures 6 and 7 where we computed the optimal bid and ask quotes (in Model A) for a value of σ IG divided by 2. The quality of the approximations depends therefore strongly on the considered market and on the market context. Practitioners must subsequently understand in depth the trade-off between accuracy and computational time (especially when there are hundreds of assets) in order to choose between the two methods. So far in this section, we have only considered optimal quotes in Model A. We see in Figures 8 and 9 that the differences between the two models is in fact very small. In other words, although Model B ignores part of the risk (or more precisely aversion to part of the risk), it constitutes a very interesting simplification of Model A. Let us now come to the case of the HY index alone. Like for the IG index, we approximated the solution θ of the systems of ODEs (3.9) by using an implicit scheme and a Newton's method at each time step to deal with the nonlinearity. Then we obtained the feedback control function (t, q HY ) → (δ HY,b (t, q HY ), δ HY,a (t, q HY )) which gives the optimal bid and ask quotes at time t when q HY t− = q HY .
We see in Figure 10 that the asymptotic regime is reached after nearly 1 hour. In Figures 11 and 12 , we plot the initial (i.e., asymptotic) values of the bid and ask quotes, obtained with Model A, for the HY index, when it is considered on a stand-alone basis. As above, we see that the market maker quotes conservatively at the bid and aggressively at the ask when he is long, and conversely that he quotes conservatively at the ask and aggressively at the bid when he is short. We also see that the closed-form approximations are satisfactory only for small values of the inventory (in absolute value). The difference between actual values and closed-form approximations can also be seen in Figures 13 and 14 , which represent the bid-ask spread and the skew of a market maker quoting optimally. The bid-ask spread is indeed not constant, and the skew is not linear on our example. In Figures 17 and 18 , we have plotted the optimal bid quotes for the two indices. 25 We see that the market maker's inventory on both indices influences his quotes. To see the influence of correlation, we have also computed the optimal quotes for four values of the correlation parameter: ρ ∈ {0, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9}. Figure 19 represents, for these different values of ρ, the bid quote δ HY,b (0, q IG , 0) for the HY index, when the inventory with respect to the HY index is equal to 0, for different values of the inventory with respect to the IG index. We see that the correlation coefficient has a strong influence on the optimal quote: the more correlated the two assets, the more conservatively (respectively aggressively) the market maker should quote at the bid when he has a long (respectively short) inventory in the other asset.
Conclusion
In this paper, we considered a framework à la Avellaneda-Stoikov with general intensity functions, and we showed that for the different optimization criteria used in the literature, the dimensionality of the problem can be divided by 2. We also showed how to find closed-form approximations for the optimal quotes, generalizing therefore the Guéant-Lehalle-FernandezTapia formulas (used by many in the industry) to the two kinds of objective function used in the literature and to almost any intensity function. We also generalized our model to the multiasset case, and showed the importance of taking account of the correlation between assets. In particular, we have derived closed-form approximations for the optimal quotes of a multi-asset market maker, an important breakthrough for practitioners who sometimes cannot solve systems of dozens or hundreds of nonlinear ODEs. The simple applications to credit indices we considered confirm the importance of the multi-asset framework. 
